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This latest product of the American Law Institute bears the unmis-
takable imprimatur of the man who has done most in this country to make 
popular the teaching of the Conflict of Laws. To Professor Beale more 
than to any other man is due the credit for the place of prominence that the 
subject of Conflicts now has in the curricula of American law schools. For 
more than thirty years he and his students, known collectively as the Amer-
ican territorial or pseudo-territorial "school", have dominated our academic 
thought on choice-of-law problems. That this group should have a para-
mount influence in determining the content of the Restatement was to be 
expected; 1 and the completed work does very largely reflect their views. 
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I. Throughout the eleven years which the preparation of the Restatement of the Con-
flict of Laws has taken Pr~fessor Beale has been the Reporter of the subject. Assoc;iated 
with him as Advisers have been Harry A. Bigelow of the University of Chicago, Joseph W. 
Bingham of Stanford University, John G. Buchanan of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Armistead 
M. Dobie of the University of Virginia, Frederick F. Faville of the Supreme Court of Iowa, 
Herbert F. Goodrich of the Univer!lity of Michigan (subsequently of the University of 
Pennsylvania), Monte M. Lemann of New Orleans, Louisiana, William E. Mikell ~f the 
University of Pennsylvania (from 1922 to 1925), William H. Page of the University of 
Wisconsin, Austin W. Scott of Harvard University (from 1922 to 1925), and William C. Van 
Vleck of George Washington University. 
Dean Goodrich has acted as Special Adviser in charge of the work on the final revision. 
He also acted as Reporter for the Chapter on Administration. Help was received, ~o, from 
others with respect to particular parts of the work and especially in connection with mari-
time torts, corporations and receiverships, and with those situations in which the <:;onfiict of 
Laws comes into contact with Constitutional Law and International Law. (Introduction, V.) 
Attention is called in the Introduction of the R~tatement to the special difficulties pre-
sented by this subject. "These difficulties", it is there stated, "are in the main due to the fact 
that the legal profession has failed until recently to recognize the great practical importance 
of the subject. Although the Reporter, Mr. Beale, and some of th?se among his Advisers 
(555) 
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Though the fallacies and general insufficiency of the doctrines of the ter-
ritorial school have already been pointed out by various writers, any ade-
quate evaluation of the Restatement must, because of the origin of the work, 
begin with an examination of the theoretical foundations upon which Pro-
fessor Beale and his followers have built. 
It is in the old rationalistic, absolutist conception of law that the doc-
trine of the territorial school of conflicts writers finds its roots. That con-
ception has seldom been better put than by Professor Beale in a well known 
passage: 
"What, then, is the common law which is scientifically studied in 
this country? It is surely a philosophical system, a body of scientific 
principle which has been adopted in each of the common law juris-
dictions in this country, as the basis of its law. Courts of each juris-
diction, in attempting to apply this general body of principles in its 
own jurisdiction, have sometimes misconceived it and misstated it, and 
this misstatement is apt to lead to a local peculiarity in the particular 
common law of the jurisdiction in question. But the general scientific 
law remains unchanged in spite of these errors; the same throughout 
all common law jurisdictions. This is the science which we teach, and 
this is the science which requires systematic statement in order that 
progress and reform may be possible." 2 
From this now generally discredited notion of law a theory of. Con-
flicts emerges. According to this theory the Conflict of Laws is conceived 
of as dealing with the "application of law in space." For every Conflicts 
problem that may be presented to a court for solution, for every "juridical 
situation" that happens to spread across a state line there is some "proper" 
law that governs, sonie one state that has "jurisdiction" over the matter. 
Only one state 3 can have jurisdiction, its domestic rules exclusive of its 
have for many years given courses in the Conflict of Laws in their respective law schools, 
instruction in the subject has been far from universal, and there has been no such general 
long-continued, critical study of the subject as has been given to Contracts; Property and the 
other principal subjects of the Common Law. Due to this pedagogical neglect the courts, 
confronted with questions of Conflict of Laws, have not, in many cases, brought to their solu-
tion an adequate background of lmowledge. As a consequence, the opinions accompanying 
their decisions are not, taken as a whole, as helpful as they are in the many other fields of 
our law". (Introduction, VI-VII.) · 
2. 14 PROCEEDINGS Assoc. oF AM. LAw ScHoOLS (1914) 38. 
3. "The question whether a contract is valid, that is, whether to the agreement of the 
parties the law has annexed an obligation to perform its terms, can on general principles be 
determined by no other law than that which applies to the acts, that is, by the law of the 
place of contracting. If the law at that place annexes an obligation to the acts of the parties, 
the promisee has a legal right which no other law has power to take away except as a result 
of new acts which change it. If on the other hand the law of the place where the agreement 
is made annexes no legal obligation to it, there is no other law whch has power to do so." 
Beale, What Law Governs Validity of a Contract (1910) 23 HARv. L. REv. 27o-271, quoting 
Summary of the Conflict of Laws, § 90. 
Professor Beale appears to recognize today that more than one state may have "jurisdic-
tion", for example, where a contract is made by correspondence, or where, in connection with 
a tort, the actor is in one state and the effect takes place in another. See REsTATEMENT, 
CoNn.ICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 64-66. 
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Conflict of Laws rules constituting the proper law for the controversy. No 
distinction is made between cases in which all the facts that gave rise to the 
controversy (save, of course, the bringing of the suit) occurred in a single 
state and cases in which facts that could be regarded as operative occurred in 
two or more states. Even in the latter case a right is said to have been cre-
ated by some one state-the state having conflict of laws "jurisdiction"-
which must be recognized by the courts of other states. The state having 
"jurisdiction" in the case thus has the power to impose its domestic rules 
upon the courts of the state where the suit is brought and the Conflicts ques-
tion is raised. But this doctrine is not regarded as applying to procedural 
questions and is also e..'{pressly limited to the "creation" of rights as dis-
tinguished from their "enforcement". When a right is validly created by 
the domestic law of one state, its "e..'{istence" as a fact cannot, according 
to this theory, be questioned elsewhere, though its "enforcement" may be 
refused. Hence, the problem of the Conflict of Laws is posed as "dealing 
with the recognition and enforcement of foreign-created rights". 4 These 
premises make up the primary notions from which Professor Beale and 
the other territorialists attempt to deduce fundamental principles that will 
make up a harmonious body of conflicts doctrine. 
The notion that the rules of the Conflict of Laws should be derived 
from the general postulate of the territoriality of law has not originated 
with the American school, but goes back to D' Argentre, the celebrated 
French jurist of Brittany of the sixteenth century.5 A more consistent de-
velopment was undertaken by the Dutch writers (Paul Voet, 1619-1677, 
John Voet, 1647-1714 and Ulricus Huber, 1636-1694) 6 and through them 
the theory found its way into England and the United States. Story ap-
proved the Dutch point of view, accepting Huber's general axioms/ but 
did not seek to erect thereon a complete "system" of the Conflict of Laws. 
The English and American decisions, though subscribing to the terri-
toriality of law in general, found no difficulty in escaping its logical implica-
tions whenever practical need suggested a different solution. It is interest-
ing to note also that the theory of the territoriality of law found no general 
acceptance on the continent and is today rejected in all continental countries, 
including the country of its birth. 
The first Anglo-American writer who has attempted to derive his entire 
"system" of the Conflict of Laws from the theory of the territoriality of law 
is Professor Beale. His system is an a priori system, created by the same 
processes of reasoning as are used by the writers belonging to the continental 
4· 3 BEALE, CASES oN CoNFLicr OF LAws ( 1902) sox, Summary, § 1; 1 TREATISE oN 
CoNFLicr OF LAws (1916) § 73. 
s. 1 LAINE, lNTRODUcrioN AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL P.RIVE (1888) 3II et seq. 
6. 2 LAINE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 95 et seq. 
7· STORY, CoNFLicr OF LAws (8th ed. 1883) § 29. 
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school. 8 Perhaps the most precise description of this approach has been 
given by Professor Cook, who has said: 
"Such writers begin with reflecting upon and establishing to their 
own satisfaction the general or essential nature of law and legal rights. 
This leads them to certain general or fundamental principles, supposed 
to flow from the nature of law and legal rights as thus established. 
These fundamental principles take the form of general statements as 
to what,-in view of the essential nature of law and legal rights.-a 
state or country 'can' and 'cannot' do in the way of creating rights, 
duties, and other legal relations. They thus come to think that the 
conflict of laws 'deals with the recognition and enforcement of foreign-
created rights,' or that it has to do with the application of law in space-
back of which statements seems to be the assumption (also deduced 
from the nature of law and legal rights) that for every situation dealt 
with in the conflict of laws there is always some one and only one 'law' 
which has 'jurisdiction,' i. e. power, to determine what legal conse-
quences shall be attached to the given situation." 9 
Although purporting to be derived from the decisions of Anglo-
American courts, Professor Beale's system actually assumes a more rigid 
form than that prevailing on the continent or in England, or than that sug-
gested by any other a priori writer.1° From the discussion of the individual 
8. The futility of any attempt to derive the rules of the Conflict of Laws from a priori 
premises and to apply them as it were mechanically was fully recognized by Jitta, an eminent 
Dutch jurist. He agreed that the local law should govern juridical situations that were 
actually localized there, but he found the prevailing system, which regarded interstate or in-
ternational juridical situations as belonging likewise exclusively to particular states or coun-
tries, to rest upon no rational basis. He contended that "in the nature of things" it is impos-
sible to assign a transaction actually having points of contact with several countries 
exclusively to a single one_o.f them without creating an artificial and lifeless system of law. 
}ITTA, THE RENOVATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (I9I9) 9I; I LA SUBSTANCE DES OBLIGA-
TIONS DANS LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE: ( 1906) 20 et seq.; LA METHODE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PR!VE (1890) 45 et seq.; INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATRECHT (I9I6) 74 et seq. 
A vigorous attack upon all a priori systems of the Conflict of Laws has been made in re-
cent times also by a distinguished French writer, M. Arminjon, many years Judge of the 
Mixed Courts, Cairo, Egypt. Speaking of the theory of the territoriality of law, he says: 
"To ascertain these rules, it is not sufficient to affirm the territorial sovereignty of states-we 
must find the reasons of justice and convenience which have inspired the rules of the Conflict 
of Laws by means of which the solution of certain difficulties is submitted to another law or 
to another jurisdiction than that of the country in which the litigation arises." ARMINJON, 
ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTJmNATIONAL, 2I RECUEIL DES COURS (1928) 454· And with respect 
to all a priori methods he says, "Notwithstanding the erudition and talent of those who have 
employed it, the deductive method has yielded no results until now; it has proved more harm-
ful than useful ; and it seems to us that it must always remain sterile." I PRECIS DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL Pruvt (2d ed. I927) 39· 
9· Cook, Tlte Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (I924) 33 YALE L J. 
457,459-
IO. On the continent the rules of the Conflict of Laws provide a certain measure of elas-
ticity. As regards the formal requirements there is frequently an alternative rule, according 
to which the transaction will be upheld if it satisfies either the law of the place of execution 
or some other law (for example, the law governing the validity of the transaction in other 
respects). And in the field of contracts, the most important of all branches of the Conflict 
of Laws from a business point of view, the continental law subscribes uniformly to the doc-
trine of autonomy, which enables the court, by invoking the expressed or implied intention of 
the parties, to reach results that are deemed just in the particular case. According to Pro-
fessor Beale the law of the place where the contract is treated as technically made under the 
rules of his system has exclusive power to create the obligation. (Beale, supra note 3.) 
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chapters of the Restatement, 11 which follows, it will be seen how far Pro-
fessor Beale's theory of the Conflict of Laws has been accepted by the 
American Law Institute. 
Chapter I, entitled "Introduction" consists of eight sections dealing 
with the subject matter and meaning of Conflict of Laws and the rules for 
the application of the Conflict of Laws. The latest version of section I 12 
indicates a strong effort to emphasize that the state of the forum in a con-
flict of laws case is not subject to having its disposition of a Conflicts case 
forced or superimposed upon it from or by another state. At the same time 
there is a-determined endeavor to still retain as fully as the adoption of the 
view just stated permits statements of "principles" and ruies of the subject 
in the familiar mode of Professor Beale, according to which there exists 
with reference to each type of Conflict of Laws factual situation some state 
which has so-called Conflict of Laws "jurisdiction" in the sense that its 
domestic rule or rules are appropriate, and exclusively so, for the type of 
case presented. Accordingly, the subject of the Conflict of Laws is defined 
as "that part of the law" of the state of the forum which determines 
"whether . . . the law of some other state will be recognized, be given 
effect or be applied." This is but a variation in phraseology of Professor 
Beale's view that the Conflict of Laws deals with "the recognition and en-
forcement of foreign created rights." 13 For paragraph I of section I 
might have been well substituted the clear and accurate eh'"Planatory state-
ment contained in the Introductory note to the chapter on Procedure which 
says: 
"While no law is in force in a state e..'l::cept its own law (see § I), 
it is one of the functions of that branch of the law known as the Con-
flict of Laws to furnish a body of rules by which, in a case involving a 
foreign element, the rule for decision of such case is that furnished by 
reference to the law of the appropriate foreign state." 14 
11. The RESTATEMENT is divided into twelve chapters, entitled, respectively, INTRODUC-
TION (§§I-8), DOMICIL (§§9-4I), }URISDICITON IN GENERAL (§§42-73), JURISDICTION OF 
CouRTs (§§ 74-n8), STATUS (§§ II9-I5I), CoRPORATIONS (§§ 152-207), PRoPERTY (§§ 2o8-
3IO), CoNTRACTS (§§ 3II-376), WRONGS (§§ 377-428), OBLIGATION OF JuDGMENTS AND OTHER 
IMPOSED DuTIES (§§ 429-464), An:mNISTRATION OF EsTATES (§§ 465-583) and PROCEDURE 
(§§ 584-625). 
I2. See also § 42· Section I of the PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT No. I stated that "Conflict 
of Laws deals with the e.."tent to which the law of a state operates and determines whether 
the law of one or of another state shall be applied to a legal situation." As finally revised 
Section I reads as follows: "(I) No state can make a law which by its own ,force is operative 
in another state; the only law in force in the sovereign state is its own law, but by the law 
of each state rights or other interests in that state may, in certain cases, depend upon the law 
in force in some other state or states. 
"(2) That part of the law of each state which determines whether in dealing with a 
legal situation the law of some other state will be recognized, be given effect or be applied 
is called the Conflict of Laws." 
I3. Beale, Summary, supra note 4. § I. 
14. Page 497· 
HeinOnline  -- 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 560 1934-1935
s6o UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 
In section 2 the term "state" is defined in a way to exclude the United 
States. From the comment it appears that the United States is a state in 
the political sense but not in a legal sense. There would appear to be no 
sufficient reason for this limitation. The mere fact that any of the indi-
vidual states of the United States is_ a sovereign state legally, as regards 
the Conflict of Laws, with reference to foreign nations in the field which is 
exclusive of the federal government, should not preclude the recognition 
that, as between it and other countries, the United States is a state legally 
in the field of its exclusive or predominant operation. The Restatement> in 
fact, recognizes this in section 45, providing that: ". . . a state has juris-
diction over all vessels flying its flag." The comment to this section states 
directly that there is no such thing as a "flag of a state of the United States" 
and that a vessel flying the flag of the United States is subject to the juris-
diction of the United States under the rule stated in the section. 
In sections 3 to 5, which define "law" and "common law" and the "legal 
nature of Conflict of Laws", a definite effort is made to declare un-
equivocally that the "law" of a particular state is made by what the courts 
of the state do and yet to adhere to a deductive view of ~erivation of law 
from "the common law" as an a priori "body of principles, standards and 
rules" or as a source of them. 
Section 6 correctly states that the rules of the Conflict of Laws of a 
state are not dependent upon principles of reciprocity. 
Sections 7 to 8 deal with preliminary questions in the Conflict of Laws 
and renvoi. Although the renvoi doctrine is rejected by the Restatement 
on principle/5 the notion of "enforcement of foreign created rights" and of 
the so-called Conflict of Laws "jurisdiction" of any state to create "rights" 
for "recognition" or "enforcement" by another state, is one of renvoi, for 
the conception is that the law of the forum enforces the identical right 
"created" by the law of the other state, referring to the particular case at 
hand, including its Conflict of Laws features. In order to have the "right" 
refer to the particular case, involving a Conflict of Laws problem, the 
"right" would have to be derived from the law of the foreign state applicable 
to such problem. The only escape from this is to admit that the state of the 
forum does not "recognize" or "enforce" a "right" thus derived from the 
law of another state inclusive of its Conflict of Laws, but at most a "right" 
corresponding to one existing by the domestic law of the other state, i. e., a 
"right" existing not for or with reference to the kind of factual situation 
presented, which is one involving Conflict of Laws, but one existing only for 
or with reference to a different kind of situation. It cannot be truthfully 
said, therefore, that the state of the forum "recognizes" or "enforces" the 
"right" created by another state for the very case presented. To speak of 
IS. See infra p. sSs. 
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"recognition" or "enforcement" of "foreign created rights" presents the 
dilemma of either renvoi on the one side or misdescription on the other. 
The chapter of the Restatement on "Domicil" is based on the erroneous 
assumption that domicil can be stated as something by itself, separate and 
apart from the particular purpose with reference to which it is employed. 
Domicil is merely a conceptual device, intermediate in processes of imposing 
legal consequences of different kinds with reference to particular purposes 
or ends. It has no meaning without reference to the particular purpose 
concerned, e. g. taxation, distribution of property. Use of "domicil" as an 
instrumentality might be said to be merely a mode of determining the con-
sequences concerned. It is a medium by or in terms of which the result 
or consequence decided upon is imposed, or a medium of explanation of the 
result or consequence attached. Domicil is treated in the Restatement as 
single in reference to all legal purposes. Although the courts frequently 
say that no person can have more than one domicil at a time, they generally, 
if not almost invariably, deal with and deteqnine domicil solely with regard 
to the particular kind of legal consequence or effect involved in each par-
ticular case. Thus, for the purpose of succession or distribution at death 
the domicil of a person might be determined to have been in one state while 
for the purpose of a particular kind of tax, it might be determined to be in 
ano.ther. Progress in the development of the law would seem to call for 
treatment of this concept or device in connection with the purpose in regard 
to which its use is occasioned. 
Domicil is identified in the Restatement with a particular point in space 
called a "place" .16 It would seem, however, that it should be identified 
neither more narrowly nor more widely than the particular legal unit in 
regard to which legal consequences or effects are concerned. 
Section 18 states that a domicil of choice cannot be acquired "without 
an intention to make the new dwelling place his home." The following 
statement by Mr. Justice Holmes in Williamson v. Osenton 17 is deemed 
to express our law more accurately. He says: 
"The essential fact that raises a change of abode to a change of 
domicil is the absence of any intention to live elsewhere, Story on Con-
flict of Laws, § 43-or, as Mr. Dicey puts it in his admirable book, 
'the absence of any present intention of not residing perman~ntly or 
indefinitely in' the new abode. Conflict of Laws, 2d ed. I 1 1 ." 
It is submitted that there is no sufficient reason for the abandonment 
of the view just quoted. Section 19 provides that ··the intention required 
for the acquisition of a domicil of choice is an intention to make a home in 
fact, and not an intention to acquire a domicil." This section is contra-
16. See §§ 9, 12 and comments. 
17. 232 U. S. 619, 624 (1914). 
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dieted by the cases giving effect to "specific intent" where there were 
physical connections or relationships with different states. 18 The Restate-
ment resolves the problem of domicil, when a person has two homes, by hold-
ing that the earlier home constitutes his domicil, unless the second home 
was regarded as his principal home.19 Whether this solution is preferable 
to that of allowing a person under these circumstances to choose his 
"domicil" may be doubtful. 
The restatement of the law relating to the domicil of married women 
was very embarrassing in view of the transitional stage of our law in this 
regard. Section 28 provides that "If a wife lives apart from her husband 
without being guilty of desertion according to the law of the state which 
was their domicil at the time of separation, she can have a separate domicil." 
It may be asked where in the decisions of our courts the capacity of a mar-
ried woman to have a separate domicil is referred to the law of the domicil 
of the spouses at the time of separation. In the final revision of the Re-
statement a caveat was added, stating that no opinion is expressed by the 
Institute whether a wife guilty of desertion according to the law of the 
state which was her domicil at the time of separation, may not acquire 
a domicil in another state. 
With respect to the domicil of children a most extraordinary statement 
is to be found in Comment c to section 34, dealing with the dom'icil of an 
illegitimate child. According to this section an illegitimate child, not 
emancipated, abandoned, or adopted, has the same domicil as that of its 
mother. Comment c states, however, that if an illegitimate child is 
legitimatized as to the father from birth,20 the child's domicil becomes that 
of the father as from the time of its birth. According to Professor Beale, 
the law of the father's domicil does not have the power to legitimatize the 
child unless the law of the child's domicil concurs, for othenvise the child 
might have the status of a legitimate child in the state of the father's 
domicil, but would retain its status as an illegitimate child in the state of 
its mother's domicil, a result which would most likely follow if the local 
law of the mother's domicil did not recognize legitimation of illegitimate 
children. Now, such a result would be inconsistent with Professor Beale's 
"principles" of the common law. But by attributing to the father the power 
to change the child's domicil from the time of birth by means of an act 
legitimatizing the child, the principle is sm,ed, for as a result both father 
and child will have the same domicil. The question may be asked, however, 
where would the child's domicil be under the Restatement from the time of 
18. See Heilman, Domicil and Specific Intent (1929) 35 WEST VA. L. Q. 262. 
19. §24. 
20. According to the REsTATEMENT such legitimation will be governed normal!, by the 
law of the father's domicil I§ 139 l. with • -"' -•at r'!garthng the pcwer of the law of th•· 
child's domicil at the time of the lt>gJttmati7•···· tct 
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its birth if the father had changed his domicil several times between the 
date of the birth of the child and the date of the legitimating act. 
One section ( § 41) of the Restatement is devoted to the domicil of cor-
porations. The comment to this section shows, however, that the meaning 
and function of domicil in connection with corporations is something entirely 
different from that of the domicil of individuals. 
The third chapter of the Restatement is devoted to "Jurisdiction in 
General". Section 42 defines the word "jurisdiction" as used in the Re-
statement of the Cmtftict of Laws as "the power of a state to create interests 
which under the .principles of the common law will be recognized as valid 
in other states." This chapter par excellence presents Professor Beale's 
conception of the conflict of laws. It deals with "jurisdiction in general", 
as contrasted with the "jurisdiction· of courts", which is developed in Chap-
ter 4, and gives to it a meaning unfamiliar to lawyers and judges. The 
definition carries the idea of a supra-state body of law, that is, "the prin-
ciples of the common law" through and by which (and not by the law of 
the place of forum as exclusively determining) the "recognition" of foreign 
created "rights" "as valid" shall be determined. Ordinarily, lawyers con-
fine the term "jurisdiction" to the power of a state within its territory or 
the power of a particular court or other societal agency within the territory 
of the state in which such agency operates. Here, however, it seems that 
jurisdiction "in its broad sense" is treated as including not only the power of 
a state to determine legal relations for that state and within that state, but 
also power to do so to any extent, even for ·other states and universally. 
According to this chapter, the essential content of the process of Conflict 
of Laws juridical disposition is treated as consisting of the generating and 
creating by another state in reference to a Conflict of Laws factual situation, 
or case, of "law" for that case (constituting a domestic rule) for the state 
of the forum to use in disposing of a Conflict of Laws problem, treating 
the process of decision as imposition of foreign (domestic) law upon the 
state of the forum and acceptance of or submission to it by the latter, in-
stead of treating the process as consisting of the state of the forum 
making its own law of Conflict of Laws for the case at hand, although in 
doing so it may employ by incorporation a domestic rule of _another state. 
The prqcess of judicial decision is thus treated as being "in reverse" of the 
direction and mode of disposition in domestic legal adjudication. It is 
putting the cart before the horse. Apart from its tendency to induce 
judicial treatment on the basis that the state of the for~m is involuntarily 
subjected to foreign law, contrary to the first paragraph of section I of the 
Restatement-"no state can make a law which by its own force is operative 
in another state" -it tends to cause courts to regard the decision of Con-
flict of Laws cases as automatic and to fail to realize their full responsibilities 
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in the disposition of those cases. Also, it involves the dilemma of the 
renvoi, which has been alluded to above. 
Extensive as the chapter is, covering so-called Conflict of Laws juris-
diction over Persons (Title B), Things (Title C), Status (Title D), and 
over Acts (Title E), it is confusing because of the necessity for keeping 
constantly in mind that something other than "jurisdiction of courts" (Chap-
ter 4) or "judicial jurisdiction" (Chapter 3, Topic 3, Title 3) is being 
dealt with. Indeed, it is believed, the Restatement would have gained in 
clarity if the chapter on "Jurisdiction in General" had been omitted and 
the essential portions thereof dealt with elsewhere. Thus sections 64-70 
belong to the chapters on Contracts and Wrongs, and should not have been 
separated from the sections directed to the specific types of factual situations 
to which they may pertain. Much of Chapter 3 is also contained in the 
chapter on Jurisdiction of Courts. The balance is of such general or purely 
theoretical character as to have no practical value. 
According to section 43, "Under the Constitution of the United States, 
the States cannot create interests if they have no jurisdiction." The rules 
laid down by the Restatement regarding "jurisdiction" are thus made in 
every particular a part of the constitutional law of the United States. The 
two illustrations given-one involving a judgment· against a non-resident 
over whom the court had no jurisdiction, and the other a sheriff's sale of 
property in an adjoining state--are, of course, clearly recognized instances 
as to which, under the circumstances, the exercise of power by the state 
would be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
But it is going a long way to assert that every exercise of power contrary 
to the rules of so-called "jurisdiction" laid down by the American Law 
Institute would constitute a violation of the due process clause. Such a 
complete identification of the Conflict of Laws with constitutional law 
would, if it were made at the present time, be most unfortunate, for the 
subject of the Conflict of Laws is still so inadequately understood by 
lawyers and judges and its development is in such an early stage with refer-
ence to commercial and social conditions that its future growth would be 
seriously retarded by requiring adherence to presently prevalent notions of 
Conflict of Laws under a requirement of due process or any other possibly 
utilizable requirement of the Federal Constitution. It will be a long time 
before there . has been a sufficiently realistic general attitude toward the 
subject developed for its inclusion in federal constitutional law not to be 
an obstruction to its development in a way well adapted to the social and 
economic conditions in this country and especially those of interstate char-
acter. 
Great difficulty was found with respect to jurisdiction over chattels. 
brought into a state without the owner's consent. In Section 52 of Restate-
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ment No. 2, Professor Beale's view 21 appears to the effect that "If a chattel 
belonging to a person who is not a citizen of or domiciled in the state, is 
brought into the state without his consent, the state has no jurisdiction 
over his title to the chattel until he has had a reasonable opportunity to 
remove it or until the period of prescription in the state has run." Pro-
posed Final Draft No. I (§52) retains Professor Beale's view concerning 
the jurisdiction of a state over the title to chattels brought into the state 
without the owner's consent, but contains various additions to or modifica-
tions of the original statement. Proposed Final Draft No. 4 suggested 
that the entire section be omitted and this suggestion was accepted. A 
caveat to section 49 states that the Institute expresses no opinion on the 
subject, but a comment to the caveat adds that even though a state may 
have jurisdiction over the chattel in the case mentioned it does not at com-
mon law exercise such jurisdiction over the title to the chattel. 
Walter F. Dodd,22 of the Chicago bar, offers the following comment 
upon Chapter 3 of the Restatement. He says: 
"The federal Constitution is the most important instrument with 
respect to interstate relations, and an attempt to restate the law of 
Conflict of Laws of the United States is certain to be ineffective if the 
requirements of the Constitution are 'outside the scope of the Restate-
ment.' Comment e to § 46 of the Restatement (page 53) says that it 
is outside the scope of the Restatement to attempt an exhaustive con-
sideration of the power of states to tax bonds of foreign corporations, 
and similar statements are made with reference to §§ so, 51, 52 and 
53· See also § 104 (Comment b). The comment on § 84, while con-
sidering constitutional provisions, makes the qualification that certain 
things may be done 'unless limited by a constitution.' . . . 
"The definitions of executive jurisdictions ( § 56), legislative 
jurisdictions (§59), and judicial jurisdiction (§ 71), are properly 
based upon the character of the acts done by the several departments 
rather than upon the body which performs the acts. The Restatement 
properly takes the view that certain functions performed by an executive 
department are in fact legislative in character and that certain func-
tions performed by a judicial department are in fact executive in char-
acter. A restatement of the law of the Conflict of Laws should not 
attempt to deal extensively with the difficult subject of the lines drawn 
by judicial decision as among the three departments of government, 
and this is expressly recognized in the special note to § 6o. Without 
dealing with such distinctions, however, a restaterp.ent can, of necessity, 
contribute nothing of real value upon this subject. The definition of 
judicial jurisdiction in § 71 makes it quite clear that little or nothing 
can be contributed by such a discussion. Judicial jurisdiction is de-
fined as involving 'a formal decision by an officer or body acting 
21. Beale, 111risdiction Ove-r, Title of Absent Owner i1~ a Chattel (1927) 40 HARV. L. 
REV. 8os. 
22. :Mr. Dodd has kindly consented to the incorporation in this article of the above com-
ments, which were furnished to the authors at their solicitation. 
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judicially.' The effort to define a 'phrase in its own terms can con-
tribute nothing to our knowledge, but perhaps this criticism may be 
met by the fact that the phrase 'acting judicially' is explained in § 75· 
Section 75, however, raises some question as to formal decisions by 
the courts, which are in some cases made without notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. Perhaps, however, this situation can be met by 
saying that summary proceedings in a court are not judicial in char-
acter, unless there is notice and an opportunity to be heard. This would 
define as executive functions all exercises of power against an indi-
vidual which are without notice and hearing, and would run counter 
to the practical basis upon which powers are divided among the three 
departments of government, but would probably be in accord with the 
theoretical definitions adopted by the Restatement." 
Taken as a whole, Chapter 4, which deals with the "Jurisdiction of 
Courts", seems thorough and comprehensive in describing the present effect 
of the decisions so far as this is possible. As to those matters with respect 
to which the decisiqns of the courts are in a more or less unsettled condition 
the rules adopted seem generally to be well adapted to the subject concerned 
and desirable from the standpoint of legal development. Special mention 
may be made of section 94, which recognizes the power of a state to direct 
a party to do an act in another state, provided such act is not contrary to 
the law of the state in which it is to be performed, thus reversing the state-
ment contained in section 100, Proposed Final Draft No. 1. With respect 
to chattels brought into a state without the owner's consent there is the 
same caveat 23 as was found under "Jurisdiction in General". Section 84 
in its earlier form 24 asserted the power of a state (subject to the constitu-
tional limitation contained in the following section) over "an individual 
who has done an act or caused an event within the state, as to a cause of 
action arising out of such act or event, if by the law of the state at the time 
when the act was done a person by doing the act or causing the event sub-
jects himself to the jurisdiction of the state as to such cause of action." 
In its final form, acts done within the state through an agent were excluded 
from this section, a caveat stating that the Institute expresses no opinion 
in that regard.25 There is considerable doubt whether such a broad doc-
trine as the one contained in section 84 should be recognized in our law. 
It looks like an importation from the continent, there being no present 
support for. the rule stated in the decisions of our courts. In continental 
law personal actions can be brought at the domicil of the defendant (gen-
eral forum) and also in the state in which the act out of which the cause of 
action arose was done (special forum). Our law has grown up along 
different lines, jurisdiction being based primarily upon personal service or 
21. Beale, htrisdiction Over Title of Abse1tt Owner 1'n a Chattel (1927) 40 HARv. L. 
24- See§ 90, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT No. I. 
25. § 84, under Comment d. 
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consent. Modern needs have caused other bases of jurisdiction to be added, 
for example, in the case of the automobile statutes. The Restatement ad-
mits, in section 85, that the Constitution of the United States restricts the 
application of section 84 as between the states of the United States. The 
question is therefore whether the rule laid down should be accepted with 
respect to acts done in foreign countries. Should the mere fact that a con-
tract is made in Canada or in some other foreign country or a tort is com-
mitted there give to such countries the power to enter a judgment against 
the individual upon constructive service with reference to any ~ause of 
action arising out of the act? It would have been better if the caveat re-
lating to acts through agents had been extended to cover acts of the prin-
cipals themselves. 
Section II5, dealing with the jurisdiction of courts to nullify a mar-
riage, has adopted a sensible solution, contrary to Professor Beale!s 
theoretical objections which found expression in the earlier versions of this 
section. 26 According to Professor Beale only the state whose law governed 
the validity of the marriage in respect of which its annulment was. sought 
has jurisdiction to grant an annulment from the beginning. 
The section relating to the power of a state to grant a divorce when 
only one of the spouses is domiciled within the state (§ II3) is still ex-
pressed substantially in the form given to it by Professor Beale.27 The 
question how to restate the law in the light of Haddock v. Haddock and 
the attitude of the New York Court of Appeals raised a difficult problem. 
The Reporter was opposed to Haddock v. Haddock 28 but the decision had 
the support of the New York bar (and presumably of the New York mem-
bers of the Council of the American Law Institute). The question, there-
fore, was how to find a formula which would meet with the approval of the 
American Law Institute. Professor Beale arrived at the formulation of 
section r 13 by way of analogy to the situation where a chattel is brought 
into a state without the owner's consent.29 According to sections 51-52, 
Proposed Final Draft No. I, a state would have jurisdiction over the title 
to the chattel if it had been brought into the state either with the owner's 
consent or if some act or omission on his part had rendered it inequitable 
for him to challenge the jurisdiction of the state. It seemed, therefore, to 
Professor Beale that where only one spouse is domiciled in the state, such 
state should be regarded as having jurisdiction for divorce if the other 
spouse consented to the establishment of a separate home in that state, or 
by his or her misconduct had ceased to have the power to object effectually 
to the acquisition of such separate home. By a singular turn of events the 
26. § 122, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT No. I. 
27. § n8, REsTATEMENT No. 2; § II9, PRoPOSED FINAL DRAFT No. I. 
28. Beale, Constitutional Protection of Decrees for Divorce (Igo6) 19 HARv. L. REv. 586. 
29. Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 417. 
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section of the Restatement ( § 52) upon which Professor Beale relied for 
his analogy was dropped at the final revision, a caveat indicating that the 
Institute wished to express no opinion on the point. However, section II3 
remained unchanged. In the light of the above facts the question is whether 
the courts of New York and the other courts taking a similar view, and for 
that matter the courts of all other states, should accept the Restatement as a 
basis for their future decisions. Under section II3 the existence of 'fraud 
becomes a jurisdictional fact 30 which leaves the status of divorce decrees 
uncertain. They may be recognized by some courts and not by others be-
cause of differences in their conclusions regarding the question of fraud. 
Differences of view may arise also with respect to the legal question by what 
rule such fraud is to be decided. With respect to the acquisition of a 
separate domicil by a married woman section 28 of the Restatement specifi-
cally provides that the question of desertion shall be determined with refer-
ence to the law of the state which was the domicil of the spouses at the time 
of separation but there is no corresponding provision in section II3 relative 
to the question by the rules of what state the misconduct of the spouses is 
to be ascertained. It would seem therefore that the adoption by our courts 
of the views expressed in section II3 of the Restatement would lead to 
greater uncertainty in the matter of foreign divorces rather than to greater 
uniformity. 
Chapter 5, entitled "Status", deals with marriage, legitimacy, adoption 
and custodianship and states· the law relating to these topics in a compre-
hensive and, on the whole, satisfactory manner. In the matter of marriage 
greater emphasis is placed in the final revision upon the rules of the state 
of domicil as determining the validity of marriage than was the case in the 
earlier drafts. 31 Proposed Final Draft No. I ( § I40) applies the rules of 
the place of celebration except as to very limited classes of cases. The only 
exception to the general rule stated of any practical importance related to 
"marriages between persons of different races, where such marriages are 
at the domicil regarded as odious," such marriage being held invalid every-
where. The Restatement in its final form ( § I32) extends this exception 
to (I ) incestuous marriages "between persons so closely related that their 
marriage is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil," and ( 2) to 
marriages "of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil makes void even 
though celebrated in another state." 
The sections relating to legitimacy show a much greater spirit of 
liberality than the proposed sections advocated by Professor Beale.32 For 
30. McClintock, Fault as a1~ Element of Divorce Jurisdiction (I928) 37 YALE L. J. 564. 
3I. See GOODRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (I927) 256 et seq.; Beale, Laughlin, Guthrie and 
Sandomire, Marriage and Domicil (I93I) 44 HARv. L. REV. 50I. 
32. §§ I42-143, REsTATEMENT No.3; §§ 147-I48, PROPOSED FINAL DRAI'T No. I. 
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example, a caveat under comment c to section I37 leaves it open for the 
courts to allow the domicil of the child to create the status of legitimacy. 
In regard to legitimation from birth, the domicil of the parent with refer-
ence to whom the status of legitimacy was claimed, at the time of the birth 
of the child, was said in the earlier drafts to have "exclusive jurisdiction." 33 
This question also is now left open by a caveat under comment (b) to sec-
tion I39· The caveat also leaves open the question whether a child may 
not be legitimatized from birth by an act or event if the law of the state of 
the child's domicil at the time of the act or event so provides, although the 
law of the parent's domicil at the time of birth or at the time of the 
legitimating act does not so provide. A caveat to section I40 referring 
to legitimation after birth likewise reserves the question whether such 
legitimation may not take place by virtue of the law of the state of the 
child's domicil at the time of the act. 
Chapter 6 is devoted to the rules of the Conflict of Laws relating to 
"Corporations". This chapter as a whole deserves commendation. It deals 
with corporations from a realistic standpoint. Thus, in comment a to sec-
tion I 52 the following declaration is made : "Throughout this Restatement 
where it is stated that the 'corporation can act,' the meaning is that the in-
corporated members can act in no other than a corporate capacity." How-
ever, speaking of the constitutional aspects of the subject, Walter F. Dodd 
says: 34 "Sections I68-I77 go more fully into the constitutional problems 
respecting foreign corporations [than is done generally in the Restatement], 
but the Restatement and comments in these sections would not be a satis-
factory guide to any one seeking to determine the law with respect to foreign 
corporations." The same criticism may be made also of Topic 6 dealing 
with cases of multiple incorporation. According to section I 54 "The fact 
of incorporation by one state will be recognized in every other state." The 
comment adds that this rule enables a corporation to sue or be sued as a 
corporation when the state in which the suit is brought has jurisdiction and 
properly exercises it. Also, that any state will "recognize" the limitation 
of the individual responsibility of the members of the corporation to their 
interest in the corporation. Also, that so far as the corporation "is per-
mitted to act as such within the state, its right to sue and its liability to be 
sued in the corporate name , . . will be recognized in respect to all ques-
tions arising out of such acts." In the instances mentioned the word 
recognize apparently has the meaning of enforcing, at least to a certain 
extent. The word recognize appears to be used in the Restatement some-
times as signifying no enforcement at all or no effectuation by legal means. 
Sometimes it means something somewhere between no enforcement and full 
33· § I42, REsTATE!I1E.L'<T No.3; § I47, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT No. I. 
34- See supra note 22. 
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enforcement and at other times full or entire enforcement. 3;; Because of 
the variable meanings attached to the word "recognize" its elimination, so 
far as possible, from discussions of the Conflict of Laws would be desirable. 
The comment to section I 54 shows that the section as stated is meaningless. 
Chapter 7, entitled "Property'', deals in Topic I with Property in 
General, in Topic 2 with Immovables, and in Topic 3 with Movables. 
Topics 2 and 3 are each subdivided into conveyances, transfers by o~ration 
of law, incumbrances, powers, marital property, equitable interests and suc-
cession on death. The Introductory Note describes carefully the meaning 
with which the terms "property" and "interest" are sought to be used. 
Also, it is explained that certain words are used factually and without 
technical significance, that is, "land," "chattel," "things"-"tangible and 
intangible." This is advantageous for the sake of clarity-to know whether 
terms are used exclusively factually, exclusively in a technical sense, or 
otherwise. "Interest" is used to mean "the normally beneficial side of a 
legal relation, as a right, power, privilege, or immunity," employing 
Hohfeld's terms. "Property" is used synonymously both with "interest" 
as above defined and with any aggregate of "interests." 36 
Section 208 adopts the view that the rule "of the state where the thing 
is" shall determine its classification as "real" or "personal" property. The 
civil law classification between "movables" and "immovables" is explained 
in a special note to the comment under this section. The remaining sections 
of Topic I pertain to "equitable conversion" and "original creation of prop-
erty." In regard to the latter the rules of the state of the situs or of original 
existence is adopted. In regard to "equitable conversion" of interests in 
land, section 209 applies the rule of the situs of the land to determine 
whether or not there has been such equitable conversion. Section 2IO, per-
taining to the question whether or not interests in "chattels" or "intangible 
things" are to be treated as having been equitably converted into real prop-
erty by "dealings" with such chattels or intangible things, adopts the rule 
or rules of the state applied to determine the effect of such dealings. 
Topic 2 contains 4I sections relating to immovables, and adopts the 
rule of the situs as determining every question of legal effect covered therein, 
including "capacity" to convey or to take or to hold (§§ 2I6, 2I9). How-
ever, section 340 in the Chapter on Contracts provides that the rules of the 
35. In connection with § 161 the phrase "recognized and given effect" appears, in which 
the words "recognized and" seem entirely superfluous ; § 26o dealing with the effect on title 
where chattels are moved into another state uses the word "recognized". But in all seven 
"Illustrations" given "enforcement" takes place. 
36. Consistently with the explanations of the In~roductory Note above referred to, would 
not an aggregate of legal relations, the net total of which are beneficial in reference to a 
particular person, be treated as "property" with respect to that person, although the aggregate · 
includes some legal relations disadvantageous in addition to some which are advantageous to 
him? If not, many aggregates of legal relations, as considered in reference to a particular 
person, which are generally regarded as "property" would be excluded, and very imprac-
ticably. 
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"place of contracting'' shall determine the validity of a promise to convey 
land, and section 341, that the rules of the place of delivery of a deed of 
conveyance of an interest in land shall determine "the contractual duties of 
the grantor." The latter section also provides that "those duties of the 
grantor with respect to the land which are not contractual in character" 
(covenants running with the land) shall be determined by the rules of the 
situs. Sections 373-374 of Restatement No. 4 provided that "the law of 
the place where a deed is delivered determines whether a covenant of title 
is contained in the deed and whether it is valid," and the.law of the situs 
whether the covenant runs with the land. Proposed Final Draft No. 4 
( § 373) suggested the formulation which was adopted by the Institute in 
section 34r. It is submitted, however, that neither the rules provided in 
the earlier drafts nor those contained in section 341 are satisfactory so far 
as covenants for title are concerned. With respect to them the only ac-
ceptable Conflict of Laws rule is that the rules of the situs should be applied, 
without regard to the question whether the particular covenant may be 
deemed contractual or non-contractual. 
In section 214 (par. 3) a rule of construction employing the "usage" 
of the state of the conveyor's domicil is adopted, based presumably upon an 
assumption of probability that the conveyor intended to convey in accord-
ance with the legal rules, conditions and usages of the state of his domicil. 
This rule should be approved where there is substantial ground for such 
assumption, but if there is not, or if it be doubtful, a rule of construction 
employing the usages or legal rules of the state of the situs would be better 
because consistent with the general application of the rttle of the situs. 87 
In paragraphs (I) and (2) of section 214 rules of construction employing 
the rule of the state of the situs are adopted. Similar rules to those of 
section 214 may be found in section 251 with reference to devises of land. 
With respect to movables (Topic 3), the rule of the situs is generally 
applied, with a caveat regarding the formalities of the conveyance where an 
aggregate unit of movables is involved, such as the various items used in 
carrying on a business-stock in trade, good will, furniture and fixtures, 
bills receivable, and cash (§ 256). The subject of assignment for 
the benefit of creditors is disposed of in two sections ( § § 263, 264). The 
section relating to voluntary assignments ( § 263) adopts the rule of the 
place where the assignment is made and provides that a state in which any 
chattel of the debtor is may accord a preference with regard to it to local 
creditors. An assignment for the benefit of creditors made in accordance 
with an insolvency or bankruptcy act of a state, whether made by the 
debtor himself or by operation of law, is ·said to be ineffective as to chattels 
37. See Heilman, Conflict of Laws Treatment of Interpr~tation and Construction of 
Deeds in Reference to Cove11ants (1931) 29 MrcH. L. REv. 277. · 
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in another state, a rule which is true only when there is a conflict between 
the foreign assignee and domestic creditors. 38 No reference is made any-
where in the Restatement to assignments for the benefit of creditors in-
volving immovables. In view of the growing importance in recent times 
of voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors in this country and 
the general interest attached to the subject of international bankruptcy, it 
is difficult to understand why these subjects were accorded such negligible 
treatment. 
Much confusion exists in our law regarding chattel mortgages and 
conditional sales. The Restatement, purporting as it does to state only the 
common law principles, ignores naturally the statutory provisions relating 
to these subjects, without which, however, the presentation of the subject 
is wholly inadequate. Section 268 (I) provides that "If, after a chattet 
is validly mortgaged, it is taken into another state without the consent of 
the mortgagee, the interest of the mortgagee is not divested as a result of 
any dealings with the chattel in the second state." As a general statement 
the rule given may be unobjectionable, but it needs qualification where the 
dealings occur after the mortgagee knew of the removal and had a reason-
able time for the assertion of his rights. However, this criticism is without 
foundation if under the Restatement this situation may be regarded as the 
equivalent of consent. The same observations are applicable to conditional 
sales (see § 275). 
Regarding marital property, it is interesting to note that Professor 
Beale's contention in favor of the rule of the state of the situs as governing 
the rights of the spouses in movables acquired during marriage, accepted 
as late as Proposed Final Draft No. 2 ( § 3 I I), was eliminated in the final 
revision and the rule of the state of domicil of the spouses, or, where they 
have separate domicils, of that spouse who acquires the movables, substituted 
( § 290 and comment c). 
In the matter of trusts of movables a distinction is made between trusts 
inter vivos and trusts created by will. The validity of a trust of movables 
by will is determined by the rules of the place of the testator's domicil at 
the time of his death (§ 295). In the case of a trust inter vivos a distinc-
tion is made between a trust of chattels and a trust of chases in action 
( § 294). The validity of the former is determined as to each item with 
reference to the rules of the state in which the particular chattel was at the 
time of the creation of the trust.39 Assignments for the benefit of creditors 
are expressly excepted from this section [ § 294 (I)] and a caveat ( § 294, 
comment g) reserves the question with respect to the validity of a trust in 
an aggregate unit of movables. The validity of a trust inter viz.,os of chases 
38. See In re Waite, 99 N.Y. 433, 2 N. E. 440 (1885). 
39· See Beale, Living Trusts of Movables in the Conflict of Laws (1932) 45 HARv. L. 
REV. g6g. 
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in action is determined by the rules of the state in which the trust was sought 
to be created. If a chose in action is evidenced by a document in which, by 
the rules of the place where it was issued, "title" to the obligation is embodied, 
a transaction purporting to create a trust therein is controlled by the rules of 
the state in which the document is at the time of the transaction ( § 294, com-
ment f). In the decisions of the courts, the rules of the state of the settlor's 
domicil, as well as the settlor's intention, have been considered in the deter-
mination of the validity of trusts inter vivos of movables. 40 The flexibility 
that thus existed in our law has been sacrificed by the Restate11Jent for the 
sake of certainty. It is submitted that with a little effort and good will both 
objectives-that of flexibility and certainty--could have been attained and a 
way provided calculated to sustain the validity of trusts to a fuller degree 
than is possible under the Restatement. The rules laid down concerning 
the administration of trusts ot movables ( § 299), though not clearly sup-
ported by convincing authority, would appear to be commendable. 
Succession on death, both in case of testamentary and intestate suc-
cession, is properly said to be determined by the rule of the state of 
decedent's domicil at the time of his death, even in the case of the direction 
in the will to convert personalty into land ( § 306, comment f). Attention 
might have been called, however, to the many statutes modifying this rule 
as regards the formal requisites for wills. 
Chapter 8, devoted to the subject of "Contracts", is one of the most 
important chapters, and yet, perhaps, the least satisfactory. From beginning 
to end it accepts Professor Beale's theory of the Conflict of Laws. According 
to this view only the state "where a contract is made" has jurisdiction, 
i. e., the power to attach legal consequences to the operative facts. If it 
does not do so, no other state can. 41 In recent times this view has been 
modified by admitting that when a contractual agreement is concluded by cor-
respondence both the states of the offeror and of the offeree have "jurisdic-
tion". 42 So far as the validity of contracts is concerned, the sole question 
considered is, therefore, where is the contract, if any, to be treated as tech-
nically "made". The fact that the final act took place in a particular state by 
mere accident, perhaps because the acceptor forgot to mail a letter in the state 
40. Cavers, Trust Inter Vivos aud the Conflict of Laws (1930) 44 HARv. L. REv. 161. 
41. See supra note 3· 
42· § 66 of the REsTATEMENT reads as follows: "When a communication is sent from 
one state to another, each state has jurisdiction over the communication." The full import 
of this rule does not appear from the Comments and Illustrations under § 66 nor from the 
rules relating to contracts. If an offer is sent from state A to state B where it is accepted, 
and suit is brought in state C, § 66 apparently permits the courts of state C to look either to 
the rules of state A or to those of state B to ascertain whether a contract was formed and 
the extent of the obligation. See Comment c. But what is the significance of such a general 
statement in the light of the specific sections relating to contracts, according to which the 
law of the state of contracting governs (§ 332), and the place of contracting is said to be 
where the letter of acceptance is mailed, where the message of acceptance is received by the 
telegraph company for transmission, and where the acceptor speaks his acceptance into the 
telephone? (§ 326 and comments). 
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of his business location, and thought of ft only upon his arrival in the state of 
his residence, is absolutely immaterial. The contract, if any, being treated as 
concluded by the posting of the letter of acceptance, 43 the rule of the state of 
his residence will determine the validity and obligation of the contract. This 
narrow Yiewpoint is opposed to the enlightened thought of the entire world. 
It is not supported by the English decisions, 44 nor by any means clearly by the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,45 nor by those of the 
state courts. 46 There are many statenum,ts in our decisions to the effect 
that "the law of the place of contracting'' is appropriate but in the majority 
of the cases the place of contracting and the place of performance coincided, 
so that the term lex loci contractus was used in the wider sense. If all the 
operative facts take place in the same state, and no intention is expressed 
that the rule of some other state is to be applied, the rule of the "place of 
contracting" should, of course, be adopted, but where the operative facts are 
not localized within some one state, a question of extraordinary difficulty 
arises, which certainly should not be settled in the way of the Restatement. 
Some suggestions have been made by writers in this country 47 in opposition 
to the mechanical mode of approach advocated by Professor Beale and now 
sanctioned by the American Law Institute, and in the direction of deter-
mining the problem in the light of the social and economic factors involved. 
More effort along these lines is needed before a satisfactory way of dealing 
with questions of the Conflict of Laws relating to contracts can be found. 
It was most unfortunate, therefore, that the American Law Institute com-
mitted itself to a view utterly opposed to any socializing of our law in this 
important field. 
One of the questions is whether there should be different Conflict of 
Laws rules with respect to the different kinds of problems arising in con-
nection with a particular type of contract or whether the same Conflict of 
Laws rule should govern all. Should a "contract" be split into pieces, as in 
the Restatement, and each piece dealt with by a separate Conflict of Laws 
rule, e. g., as to "validity", "performance", "discharge otherwise than by 
performance", "assignability" ; or would it be preferable if the same Con-
flict of Laws rule were adopted, so far as practicable, with reference to 
every possible phase of a particular transaction in order that the treatment 
of every phase should be as consistent as possible with the treatment or 
possible treatment of every other phase? If different Conflict of Laws 
43· § 326. 
44· DICEY, CoNFLICT OF LAws (Keith's ed. 1932) 647-663. 
45· Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract (1909) 23 HARV. L. REV. 79, 
82 et seq. 
46. I d. at 85 et seq. · 
47. Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts ia the Conflict of Laws (1921) 30 YALE 
L. J. 565; Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem (1933) 47 HARV. L. REV. 173; 
Heilman, htdicial Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws (1934) 43 YALE L. 
J. 1o82. 
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rules are applied to different phases, so that as to these the domestic rules of 
different states are employed which may have quite dissimilar rules of 
contract law, incongruities, undesirable or even irreconcilable, may result. 
Again, should there be the same treatment of all contracts or should differ-
ent types of contracts be subjected to different treatment? Should a dis-
tinction be made between the rules applicable to Conflict of Laws situations 
relating to contracts arising between the states of the United States and 
those arising between this country and foreign countries or between foreign 
countries? 48 
The Restatement deals with the subject of contracts under the follow-
ing topics : (I) place of contracting, ( 2) creation of a contract, ( 3 r transfer 
of contractual rights, (4) performance of contract, and (S) discharge of a 
contract without performance. The greatest variety of contracts are dealt 
with in the same manner (e. g., bills and notes, insurance, contracts, con-
tracts of guaranty, carriers' contracts, partnership contracts, and contracts 
relating to land), as if the problem were always identical. As regards the 
"creation" of any of these contracts the only inquiry is-where was the 
contract, if any, made? The "law" of the state of "contracting'' determines 
both the validity and the nature of the obligation of the alleged contract. But 
the performance is subjected to the rule of the place of performance. Such a 
general treatment simplifies the Conflict of Laws relating to contracts, but it 
does so in a formalistic manner which is absolutely out of line with any 
rational approach toward the subject. In order to be of real service the 
individual types of contract should have been dealt with in detail. Bills 
and notes, insurance contracts. sales contracts, carriers' contracts. contracts 
for arbitration and the like present different types of problems which should 
have been considered in the light of their particular requirements. Instead 
we find the subject of bills and notes disposed of in a few sections relating 
to the place of contracting ( § § 312-316, 320), one section relating to the 
creation of contracts ( § 336) and one section relating to the performance 
of contracts (§ 369). We are t9ld in section 336 that the "law of the place 
of contracting" determines whether a mercantile instrument is negotiable 
and valid, and in section· 369 that the "law of the place of payment" deter-
mines the necessity and sufficiency of presentment for payment, of demand, 
of protest, and of'notice of dishonor. Not only are these sections insuffi-
cient, but they falsify the existing law. Comment a under section 369 
sf<!,tes that "The drawer of a negotiable bill of exchange or the endorser 
of a negotiable bill or note, in the absence of circumstances indicating a 
contrary intent, agree to pay the instrument in the event of dishonor at the 
place where the instrument is payable." Danz'el on Negotiable Instruments 
states that this view is opposed to an "overwhelming current of author-
48. Heilman, s11pra note 47, at 1098 et seq. 
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ities." 49 In case of dishonor drawer and endorser agree to pay in the state 
where they entered into their respective contracts, and it is the rule or rules 
of that state which should be applied to determine the conditions upon which 
they are to be liable.50 It is worth noticing also that apart from questions 
affecting the validity of bills and notes, in regard to which there are some 
differences of view, our courts hold practically unanimously--contrary to 
the Restatement-that the rules of the place or places of performance of 
the individual contracts shall determine the rights and duties of the parties, 
and even the question of negotiability, and not the rule of the place or 
places of contracting. 
Insurance contracts are mentioned specifically only in connection with 
the place of contracting (§§ 317-319), and sales contracts, only so far as 
they relate to land, which contracts are dealt with in two sections ( § § 340-
341). The subject of carriers' contracts is disposed of in sections 337-338. 
We are told that the "law of the ·place of contracting" determines the duties 
of the carrier with respect to passengers or goods ( § 337) and the validity 
of a stipulation limiting the carriers' liability ( § 338). Comments on the 
sections inform us that in the case of interstate and foreign commerce, 
federal legislation controls so far as it is applicable, and that the effect of 
the Interstate Commerce Act in changing the obligations of the parties is 
not within the scope of the Restatement. Arbitration agreements are passed 
over in complete silence. 
Much may be said by way of criticism of the individual sections con-
tained in the Restatement, but one or two observations of a general nature 
must suffice. Most noticeable of all is the fact that the problem involving 
the effeCt of an express declaration of the parties in a contractual agreement 
that the "law" of a particular state shall govern or that its rules shall be 
applied to disputes arising out of such agreement is not even mentioned 
in the Restatement. Again, the Restatement makes a fundamental differ-
ence between the "nature.and extent" of duty [§ 332 (f)], which is to 
be determined by the rules of the place of contracting, and the discharge 
of duty by performance, which is to be determined by the rules of the 
place of performance (§ 358). Although these sections are verbally con-
sistent with each other, juristically they are mutually inconsistent, for 
nature and extent of duty can only be described in terms of the 
nature or k~nd of performance required for the fulfillment of duty. 
----Nature--and--extent mean -nothing ...else-than .whatJS-required.io-he-done- in__ 
order to avoid the secondary liability which non-performance will create. 
Section 370 provides that "the law of the place of performance determines 
whether a breach has occurred." This amounts to saying that "the law of 
49. I DANIEL, NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. 1933) § 1054; see also LoRENzEN, CoN-
FLICT OF LAWS RELATING TO BILLS AND NOTES (1919) 122. 
50. LoRENzEN, op. cit. supra note 49, at 122. 
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the place of performance" determines what has to be done to fulfil the duty 
undertaken, i. e., what has to be done not to breach the duty. A determina-
tion of the scope of the primary duty of performance is necessary in order 
to determine whether or not a secondary ·duty to pay damages has arisen. 
The two are inseparable. There is the same Inseparability between the 
e..xistence and scope of primary duty and existence and scope of secondary 
duty to pay damages, and yet section 372 provides that "the law of the 
place of performance determines the right to damages for a breach of a 
contract and the measure of -damages." The fault is not with sections 358, 
370, and 372, but with section 332 (f). 
Chapter 9 is entitled "Wrongs", of which the first five topics deal, re-
spectively, with torts, actions for death, workmen's compensation, maritime 
torts, and damages, and the last topic, with crimes. In the matter of torts 
"the law of the place of wrong" is said to govern. According to section 
377, "The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to 
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." The language implies 
that in reference to a particular occasion there can be but "one place of 
wrong'' and that under section 377 imposition of Conflict of Laws liability 
can be made but once, and with reference to the domestic rules of one and 
only one state. Sections 64 and 65 would appear to contradict this state-
ment, for, according to these sections, each state in which any event in the 
series of act and consequences occurs may exercise "jurisdiction" to "create'' 
rights or other interests as a result thereof.51 By way of explanation, com-
ment a to section 377 says: nAlthough by statute, the state in which any 
eYent in the train of consequences, starting with the act of the wrongdoer 
and continuing until the final legal consequences thereof, may make the 
event a wrong, the situation is, in most states, governed by the common 
law. The common law selects some particular point in the train of events 
as the place of wrong." Assuming that an actor in state A causes injury 
to a party in state B as a result whereof such party dies in state C, the place 
of the wrong, according to the Restatement, would be by common law prin-
ciples in state B/2 but by statute it .could be located likewise in states 
A and C. If such statutes existed in states A and C, it would seem clear 
from the Scope Note to Topic r, Chapter 9, that the plaintiff could base his 
claim for damages either upon the rules of state A, or upon those of state B, 
or upon those of state C. Part of the Scope Note reads: "A court in which 
the question is raised, whether a tort has been committed, will make refer-
ence to the law of the place where the duty to pay for an injury is alleged 
51. § 64 reads: "A state can provide for the creation of interests as a result of acts done 
in the state or of events which happen there." 
§ 65 reads as follows: "If consequences of an act done in one state occur in another state, 
each state irt which any event in the series of act and consequences occurs may exercise 
icgislative jurisdiction to create rights or other interests as a result thereof." 
52· § 391, Comment b. 
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to have been imposed." A more difficult question, which is not answered 
by the Restatement, would be whether the plaintiff would be obliged to elect 
between the causes of action which have arisen under the respective rules 
of the three states or whether a judgment for or against him under one of 
them would necessarily bar an action under the others. 
Section 380 states that "where by the law of the place of wrong, the 
liability-creating character of the actor's conduct depends upon the applica-
tion of a standard of care, the application of such standard will be made by 
the forum in accordance with its own rules of evidence, inference and judg-
ment," but where such standard "has been defined in particular situations 
by statute or judicial decision of the law of the place of the actor's conduct, 
such application of the standard will be made by the forum." Here it may 
be asked-in view of the fact that the state of the place of the wrong, having 
under the Restatement exclusive "jurisdiction" with respect to common law 
torts, has imposed the duty of due care, how does the state in which the 
actor's conduct has taken place get "jurisdiction" to narrow the general 
standard of due care in the particular situation? Again, how is section 382 
to be reconciled with the fundamental thesis of the Restatement in the matter 
of torts? This section allows two exceptions to the adopted general rule that 
"the law of the place of the wrong" controls. One applies to the person "who 
is required by law to act or not to act in one state in a certain manner." Such 
person is not to be held for the consequences in another state resulting from 
his action or failure to act. The second exception provides for immunity 
from liability for consequences in a second state resulting from the exer-
cise of a so-called privilege conferred by a rule of the place of acting. 
Under this section the legal effects of the behavior concerned are deter-
mined by a Conflict of Laws rule employing the domestic rule of the place 
of conduct or behavior of the actor. The basis supporting the rule of this 
section would support application of the domestic rules of the place of the 
actor's behavior generally. The problem whether the rule of the state of 
the actor's conduct should control in the field of torts or that of the state in 
which the consequences of the actor's conduct manifest themselves has been 
considered elsewhere, and in at least one foreign country (Germany) the 
question has been resolved by giving to the plaintiff the choice of basing 
his claim upon the domestic rule of any of the states concerned. 53 
Section 390 applies the rule of the place of the wrong to the question 
of survival of tort. But nothing is said in the Restate11zent concerning the 
rule applicable in case of a "revival" of an action where the tortfeasor or 
the injured person dies during the pendency of the action.54 With respect 
53. LoRENzEN, CAsES oN CoNFLICT oF LAws (3d ed. 1932) 215, n. 4· 
54. Martin's Adm. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 151 U. S. 673 (1894) ; Baltimore & 0. R. 
R. v. Joy, 173 U.S. 226 (1899). See also Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387 (1933). 
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to limitation of actions for death, section 397 provides that no action can 
be brought anywhere after the e>..-piration of a time limit fixed in the death 
statute, but it adds in comment b that the limits of time in the death statute 
of the forum may be interpreted as a statute of limitations applicable to all 
actio~s for death irrespective of the place of wrongJ as well as a statute 
limiting the existence of r~ghts created by the statute. In such event, suit 
must be brought within the time limited in the statute, as well as within the 
time limited in the statute of the place of injury. Section 605 
deals with the same matter, but omits the qualification which allows 
the application of the rule of the forum to causes of action arising 
in another, state. As regards the amount of recovery for the death 
of a hutnan being, comment a to section 417 refers to the rule of 
the place of the wrong but adds in a comment that "a statutory 
limit by the law of the forum on the amount that can be recovered in a 
court of that state for death, irrespective of the place of wrong will, how-
ever, be enforced." This is repeated in substance in section 6o6, comment a 
and illustrations. The Restatement studiously avoids in both connections 
any mention of the "public policy doctrine" of the forum and prefers to 
say in effect that the time limitation and limitation on the amount of re-
covery of the forum are "substantive" or "conditions" with reference to 
local causes of action but "procedural" with respect to foreign causes of 
action. The public policy doctrine in the Conflict of Laws may be vague 
and its application frequently indefensible but resort to it within proper 
limits is preferable to the expedient of regarding the same rule as "sub-
stantive" for domestic situations and "procedural" for Conflict of Laws 
situations. In the case of the time limitation or limitation on the amount 
of recovery above mentioned, there is no sufficient reason for the applica-
tion of the provisions of the fotum to foreign causes of action and the 
Restatement might well have taken that position. 
The attempt to state the rules of the Conflict of Laws applicable to 
Workmen's Compensation Acts in terms of "common law principles" rather 
than deal with the subject in a realistic manner deprives this part of the 
Restatement of any practical value. Here we find a few general statements 
which describe neither the decisions of the state courts nor the limitation 
- upon the powers of the states imposed by the Federal Constitution. \Vhere 
the contract of employment is made in one state and the injury takes pl,ace 
in another, the rules of jurisdiction laid down in Chapter 3 of the Restate-
ment would confer jurisdiction upon both states, and this is the basic attitude 
of sections 398-400. , 
The jurisdiction of the state in which the workman sustained the harm 
is asserted in section 399, which is subject, however, to section 401, provid-
ing that "if a. cause of action in tort or an action for wrongful death either 
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against the employer or against a third person has been abolished by a 
Workmen's Compensation Act of the place where the contract of employ-
ment was made or of the place of wrong, no action can be maintained for 
such tort or wrongful death in any state." 
No statement corresponding in substance to section 40I was contained 
in Proposed Final Draft No. 3· 55 Section 40I was inserted on the final 
revision in consequence of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bradford 
Electric Light Co. v. Clapper.56 Comment b to section 40I reads as fol-
lows: 
"b. EFFECT OF CoNSTITUTION OF UNITED STATES. If the Com-
pensation Act of the state where the contract of employment is made 
abolishes the common law or statutory right of action either as a result 
of the fact that the employment was entered into in that state or by 
reason of the election of the parties to come within the operation of 
that Act, no action can be maintained in any state irrespective of where 
the workman was injured or killed. This result is required as between 
States of the United States under the full faith and credit clause of the 
Constitution." 
This comment apparently was intended to state the effect of the deci-
sion of the Bradford case, which is interpreted as making compulsory one 
aspect of the "common law principle" set forth in section 401. In reality 
the decisions of our courts prior to the Bradford case did not support with-
out qualification the broad principle announced in that section, nor can it 
be said definitely that the Bradford case has imposed the result stated in 
comment b. In the Bradford case Mr. Justice Brandeis said: 57 "It clearly 
was the purpose of the Vermont Act to preclude any recovery by proceed-
ings brought in another State for injuries received in the course of aVer-
mont employment." In a later case a different result was reached by the 
Supreme Court because the Tennessee act, as interpreted by the courts of 
Tennessee, did not "preclude recovery under the law of another state." 58 
There is a suggestion also in the opinion of the Bradford case that a differ-
ent result might be permitted if New Hampshire's interest in the applica-
tion of its law had been greater.59 Without additional decisions clarifying 
the subject, it is impossible to know where. the Supreme Court will draw 
the exact line. Any statements made at the present juncture concerning 
55. See § 436, Proposed Final Draft No.3. 
s6. 286 u.s. 145 (1932). 
57. 286 U. S. 145, at 153. 
58. Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U. S. 439 ( 1933). 
59. "Moreover, there is no adequate basis .for the lower court's conclusion that to deny 
recovery would be obnoxious to the public policy of New Hampshire. • . . The interest of 
New Hampshire was only casual. Leon Clapper was not a resident there. He wa~ not con-
tinuously employed there. So far as appears, he had no dependent there. It is difficult to see 
how the State's interest would be subserved, under the circumstances, by burdening its courts 
with this litigation." 286 U. S. 145, at 161-162. 
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the respective powers of the state in which the employment took place and 
of the state in which the harm occurred can be merely conjectural. 
Comment c to section 40I states that where a case falls within the 
scope of admiralty jurisdiction the remedy under a state's Workmen's Com-
pensation Act cannot be constitutionally allowed in any state of the United 
States. This is true as a general rule but with an important exception, viz. 
where "the matter is of mere local concern." 60 In the cases falling within 
the e.."ception state Workmen's Compensation Acts may apply. 
Section 400 states directly that no recovery can be had under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act of any state if neither the harm has occurred 
within the state nor the contract of employment was made in such state. 
The Restatement recognizes, however, that if the employment takes place 
through an employment agency in one state and the entire business is car-
ried on in another state, the Workmen's Compensation Act of the latter 
· state may be applied. This case apparently can be brought within the "prin-
ciples" of the Restatement only if the hiring was not definitive until the 
workman reported at the principal office of the business. 61 
Sections 404-4I I deal with Maritime Torts. Section 4IO (b) states 
that liability for an alleged tort caused by collision on the high seas outside 
the territorial. waters of any state is governed "by the law of the forum if 
the laws of the states whose flags the vessels fly are not the same." This 
rule is supported by dicta of the Supreme Court of the United States 62 
which are regarded by the admiralty bar as settling the law. Professor 
Beale and his regular body of Advisers had advocated "the law of the flag 
of the vessel harmed, or of the vessel on which the person or thing harmed 
is carried at the time of the wrong." 63 
Chapter IO, entitled "Obligation of Judgments and Other Imposed 
Duties" includes besides the subject of judgments, quasi-contractual obliga-
tions, alimentary duties and alimony. The rules stated in this chapter do 
not call for any fundamental criticism. Only individual sections can be 
fairly objected to. One of these is section 449 (I), which provides "A 
valid foreign judgment that the defendant do or refrain from doing an act 
other than the payment of money will not be enforced by an action on the 
judgment." This expresses Professor Beale's view, which he has defended 
6o. Millers' Indenmity Underwriters v. Braud, ·270 U. S. 59 (1926); Alaska Packers 
Assoc. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 276 U. S. 467 (1928); Sultan Ry. & Timber Co. 
v. Dept. of Labor, 277 U.S. 135 (1928). 
61. Comment a under § 398 reads as follows: "The case of employment through an em-
ployment agency in one state, where the entire business is carried on in another state, and the 
applicant is merely sent to the principal office to report, is specially treated. In such a case, 
the relation is regarded as established not by the action of the agency, but by the workman 
reporting for work at the principal office of the business, the transaction at the employment 
office not being regarded as definitive hiring. In that case, the Compensation Act of the state 
where the workman reports for duty governs compensation." 
62. The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24 (1881); The Belgenland, II4 U. S. 355 (1885). 
63. § 446, Proposed Final Draft No. 3· 
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for many years, according to which an equitable decree that the defendant 
convey to plaintiff land in another state is not enforceable in the state of 
the situs. This is contrary to the most recent decisions which hold that an 
action in equity will lie, the former decree being regarded as a conclusive 
determination of the rights of the parties.64 Mr. Justice Holmes has ex-
pressed the view that such a decree is entitled as between the parties to "full 
faith and credit". 6;; The rule adopted by the Restatement thus expresses 
the reactionary and unprogressive point of view. 
Chapter I I deals with the administration of estates, and is divided into 
two topics-the administration of decedents' estates and receiverships. We 
are told in the Introduction that the chapter presented more difficulties than 
any other and that it was "developed from the consideration of some sixteen 
successive preliminary drafts at an equal number of conferences." So far 
as the administration of decedents' estates is concerned, the Restatement 
deserves the highest praise. It constitutes a piece of constructive work 
which ought to influence most favorably the development of this branch of 
the Conflict of Laws. The Restatement lays down reasonable rules with 
respect to many points which were left uncertain by the decisions or re-
garding which there were no decisions. In other respects it restated the 
law in a way to avoid needless obstacles to a prompt settlement of decedents' 
estates.66 Attention may be called by way of illustration to sections 474-
475 and 48I-482, which make the rightfulness of the collection of chattels 
and debts in another state than that of the appointment of an administrator 
dependent upon the existence of a local administrator or knowledge thereof, 
rather than upon the existence of local creditors. 
The rules developed under administration of decedents' estates with 
respect to the collection of chattels and claims, the transfer of chattels and 
claims, the administration relating to land, the proof and payment of claims, 
suits by and against administrators, accountability of administrator and 
disposition of balance have been adopted substantially with respect to re-
ceiverships. -
Section 525, relating to the place where the principal receiver may be 
appointed, provides in subdivision (b) that such receiver may be appointed 
"in the case of an action instituted by a creditor, by a competent court of 
any state in which a substantial portion of the assets and the principal 
operating offices of the association are located; or if there is no such state, 
by a competent court of any state in which a substantial portion of the assets 
is located." This rule ought to be followed. So far as the federal courts 
64. Redwood Investment Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455, 221 Pac. 973 (1923); Matson 
v. Matson, 186 Iowa 007, 173 N. W. 127 (1919). 
65. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. I (1909). 
66. Cf. Beale, Vol1mtary Payment to a, Foreig1~ Administratar (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 
597· 
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are concerned, section 525 (b) does not take account of section 51 of the 
Judicial Code,67 providing that where the sole ground of federal jurisdiction 
is diversity of citizenship, suit must be brought in the district of resi-
dence of either the complainant or the defendant. It seems, however, 
that if no objection is raised under section 51, a federal court will entertain 
and grant an application by a creditor for the appointment of a receiver if 
the defendant corporation, though incorporated in another state than that 
in which the federal court's district is located, has its principal office and a 
substantial 68 amo~nt of its property in the district. 60 
Section 526, which declares that "the commencement of an action in-
volving the appointment of a principal receiver in a competent court in 
accordance with the rule stated in section 525 will be recognized as precluding 
the subsequent appointment of a principal receiver by the court of any other 
state, provided that in the first action the receiver is seasonably appointed," 
also states a desirable rule which, however, has been frequently disregarded 
by the state courts. 70 
Section 77-B of the Bankruptcy Act (approved June 7, 1934) abolishes 
ancillary receiverships with respect to corporate reorganizations under the 
supervision of the federal bankruptcy court. The section applies to all cor-
porations other than insurance and banking corporations, and building and 
loan associations. 71 As equity receiverships will be largely superseded by 
the statutory reorganization proceedings referred to, the rules of the Re-
statement with respect to receiverships will have only a limited field for 
application. 
Under the title of "Procedure," which constitutes the last chapter of 
the Restatement, Topic I deals with distinction between substance and pro-
cedure, Topic 2, with proceedings in court, Topic 3, with conditions of 
maintaining suit, Topic 4, with access to courts, and Topic 5, with foreign 
law. Most of the sections are based upon settled rules of our law which it 
would be difficult to disregard. The statute of limitations may be taken as 
an example (§§ 6o3-6o4). Sections 614-615 relating to actions for trespass 
upon foreign land and to acts in one state causing injury to land in another 
state, perhaps also belong to this category, although in this instance the 
indefensibility of the rule might well have justified greater boldness on the 
6;. 42 STAT. 849 (I922), 28 u. s. c. A. § 112 (I927). 
68. See Burnite Coal Co. v. Riggs, 274 U. S. 2o8 (1926); Billig, Corporate ReorgmJiza-
tiot£: Equity vs. BatJkruptcy (I933) I7 MINN. L. REv. 237, 253-254-
6g. There is much variation in the holding of the federal courts concerning the amount 
of assets or property requisite to be located within the district of the court before any applica-
tion for a receivership will be granted. Billig, supra note 68, at 248-249. 
70. Frankland v. Remington Phonograph Corp., I3 Del. Ch. 3I2, 119 Atl. 127 (I922); 
Michel v. Necker, Inc., 90 N. ]. Eq. I7I, I06 Atl. 449 (I9I9); Universal Stamp and 
Stationery Co. v. Garod Corp., IOO N. ]. Eq. 453, I36 Atl. 329 (I927). 
71. Friendly, Some Comments Ot£ the Corporation ReorganizatiotJS Act (I934) 48 HARv. 
L. REv. 39; \Veiner, Corporate Reorganization: Section 77-B of the Bankrucpty Act (I934) 
34 CoL. L. REv. I I73· 
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part of the Institute, and to have warranted the statement that such actions 
should be treated as transitory. 72 Other sections are not so well supported 
and there was here opportunity to do some constructive engineering for law 
improvement, 73 which opportunity, however, was not taken advantage of. 
For example, the statute of frauds, whether stated in terms of prescribing 
a rule of procedure or not, is substantive, for regardless of phraseology it 
states a requirement of an operative fact necessary for enforcement of a 
promise. 74 This might well have been recognized by the Restatement in-
stead of admitting ( § 598, comment a) that it may prescribe a rule of pro-
cedure for the courts of a state or it may affect the formal validity of con-
tracts. Nor was it well to suggest that the statute of frauds of the forum, 
which is regarded as affecting the formal validity of contracts made there, 
might be regarded as of such importance as to be applicable to contracts 
made elsewhere. 
It is submitted that not all presumptions, other than conclusive pre-
sumptions, are "procedural" so as to be controlled by the rules of the forum. 
The illustration given under comment c of section 595 may serve as an ex-
ample. When by the rule of the state in which the transaction in question 
took place a stipulation in a bill of lading limiting the carrier's liability for 
the negligence of his servants is not binding without proof of assent to the 
terms of the bill, whereas by the rule of the forum "an inference is drawn 
from the receipt of the bill without dissent that the shipper assented to the 
terms of the bill", the assent or non-assent is one of the operative facts 
necesary to create a binding contract and as such should be determined by 
the rule of the state of the transaction. The question concerned is clearly 
substantive. 75 
The burden of proof also, so far as it involves the question of which 
party bears the risk of non-persuasion of the trier of the fact, should have 
been regarded as substantive for the reason that where the evidence is evenly 
balanced the decision will be against the party having the burden of proof. 
'):'he Restatement holds that it is procedural but admits that the rule of the 
state where the cause of action arises may make it a "condition of the cause 
of action itself," in which event the rule of such state should be applied 
( § 595, comment a, § 6or). 
It is the expectation of the American Law Institute that the restate-
ments will be accepted by our courts as authoritative. In view of the fore-
72. Little v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & 0. Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846 (18g6). 
73. See Cook, "Snbstance" and "Procednre" in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 YALE 
L. ]. 333. 
74- Lorenzen, The Statute of Fra11ds and the Conflict of Laws (1923) 32 YALE L. ]. 3II. 
75. In support of the RESTATEMENT see Hoadley v. Northern Transp. Co., IIS Mass. 304 
(1874). Co11tra: Michigan Central R. R. v. Boyd, 91 Ill. 268 ( 1878) ; Coats v. Chicago, Rock 
Island & P. Ry., 239 Ill. 154, 87 N. E. 929 (1909); Hartman v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 
39 Mo. App. 88 (1890); Valk v. Erie Ry., 130 App. Div. 446, II4 N.Y. Supp. 964 (1st Dep't 
1909); Frasier v. Charleston & W. Ry., 73 S.C. 140, 52 S. E. 964 (1905). 
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going discussion it would seem, however, that so far as the Restatement of 
the Conflict of Laws is concerned, such expectation is not well founded. A 
concrete example may serve perhaps to give further point to this allegation. 
Let us suppose that the question before the court is whether the renvoi doc-
trine shall be accepted in a particular situation. Would the court be justified 
in basing its conclusion upon the Restatement? The earliest drafts rejected 
the doctrine except in one or two classes of cases. In Restatement No. 2 the 
exception reads as follows : 
"If a question of status or of title to land is to be determined, the 
court first decides in accordance with its own Conflict of Laws, by the 
Law of what state the existence of the status or of the title is to be 
determined and it then decides the question as it would be decided by a 
court of that state." (Section 8.) 
In the .Proposed Final Draft No. I the renvoi is limited in Section 8 to 
marital status and title to land. It reads : 
"If a question of marital status or of title to land is to be deter-
mined, the court first decides, in accordance with its own Conflict of 
Laws, by the law of what state the existence of the status or of the 
title is to be determined; and it then determines the existence of the 
alleged status or title as its existence would be determined on the same 
facts by a court of the latter state." 
In the Proposed Final Draft No. 4 the application of renvoi is ex-
tended so as to include title of chattels and, on the other hand, is still further 
limited, as regards status, being now confined to the validity of a decree of 
divorce. Section 8 reads as follows : 
"All questions of title of land or of chattels or as to the validity 
of a decree of divorce are decided in accordance with the law including 
the rules of Conflict of Laws of the situs or of the domicil respectively." 
In the Final Restatement the application of renvoi to questions of title 
to chattels is dropped. Section 8 now reads : 
" (I) All questio,ns of title to land are decided in accordance with 
the law of the state where the land is, including the Conflict of Laws 
rules of that state. 
" ( 2) All questions concerning the validity of a decree of divorce 
are decided in accordance with the laws of the domicil of the parties, 
including the Conflict of Laws rules of that state.'' 
If the authorities had been given, it would have appeared that there is 
no support for section 8 in any decision rendered by an American court. It 
has support in England,7 & but the English courts have adopted the renvoi 
76. Armitage v. Attorney General, [1906] P. 135; !11 rtt Baines (unreported), DICEY, op. 
cit. supra note 44, at 596. 
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doctrine also in other situations than those within section 8. 77 The question 
naturally arising is why was the renvoi doctrine adopted in. the two cases 
mentioned and not in the others? If the choice was made on the basis of 
practical expediency, the question might be raised why, in the matter of 
status, the renvoi was retained with respect to divorce.78 
In view of its history section 8 is not calculated to inspire' confidence 
in its soundness. And what is true of section 8 applies with equal force to 
many other sections of the Restatement dealing with doubtful points: In 
some cases they may reflect the ideas of Professor Beale and in others those 
of Dean Goodrich, who was in charge of the final revision of the Restate-
ment. In some instances the section in question may have had the benefit 
of a thorough discussion on the part of all Advisers and in others it may 
have had only their formal approval. With no means of information re-
garding the arguments in support of any particular section and with no 
assurance that the final conclusion represents the mature judgment 79 of the 
experts working on the Restatement, our courts would not be justified in 
basing their decisions upon any of the rules announced in the Restatement 
regarding which there is serious doubt. 
The objections to the use of black letter texts in treatises on the Con-
flict of Laws have been set forth fully by Professor Yntema 80 in an article 
in which he reviewed a handbook appearing in the Hornbook Series, which 
had reduced the subject to 207 black letter texts. The criticisms thus made 
would appear to be applicable with even greater force to the Restatement of 
the Conflict of Laws, containing, as it does, 6~5 black letter texts, for, the 
more detailed the provisions the greater the likelihood that they will be re-
garded as constituting the law itself rather than as being merely shorthand 
descriptions of attempted modes of solution of prob~ems involving com-
plicated social experiences. The American Law Institute having been or-
ganized for the purpose of promoting "certainty and simplicity" SJ. in the 
statement of rules, it naturally chose a method which at least gave the ap-
pearance of simplicity. The classification of completely dissimilar situations 
under a general abstract principle . can, of . course, never lead to certainty. 
It will inevitably create exceptions and refinements and a general repetition 
of tl).e wilderness of single instances ?-nd precedent which it was the purpose 
77· DICEY, op. cit. sttpra note 44, at S63 et seq. 
7S. There would appear to be no room under the provisions of the RESTATEMENT relating 
to divorce for any rmvoi doctrine as between the states of the United States. If it was felt 
that it would be of use with reference to foreign countries having different rules of the con-
flict of laws the RESTATEMENT should have indicated the circumstances under which this 
would be so. 
79. Lack of'time must have prevented the many sections in Proposed Final Draft No.4, 
making vital changes in the earlier drafts from receiving the same consideration on the part 
of the Advisers as those contained in the earlier drafts. · ' · 
So. The Hombook Method ami the Co11.jlict of Laws (r92S) 37'YALE L. J. 468. 
Sr. I PROCEEDINGS AMER. LAw INSTITUTE (1923) 6 et seq. 
' ' 
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of the Restatement to avoid. The only way in which this can be obviated 
is by giving greater discretion to the courts to handle the cases on their 
merits rather than by the application of a rigid rule. If it had been the 
desire to increase the discretion of the courts, general principles capable of 
an elastic application might have been formulated, which would have at 
least enabled the courts to get rid of artificial rules. However, instead of 
general directions we find in the Restatement a vast number of specific rules 
conforming largely to the rigid pattern suggested by Professor Beale. The 
Institute thus failed to avail itself of the only effective means at its com-
mand to bring about in reality greater simplicity in the law. 
In the opinion of the writers, the Restatement of the Co~tflict of Laws 
should not have been undertaken at the present time. In recent years strong 
protests have been made against the territorial or pseudo-territorial view-
point of the Conflict of Laws expressed by Professor Beale and his "school", 
the demand being insistent that the fundamental bases of the subject be re-
examined. 82 Much of the work so far done has been of a critical and 
exploratory character. Substantial constructive work has been accomplished 
and more time should have been allowed for further efforts in the new 
direction. Many problems of a fundamental character required further 
illumination before a restatement of the Conflict of Laws should have been 
undertaken. Should the Conflict of Laws continue to be regarded as ·hav-
ing nothing to do with the merits of the dispute between the parties and as 
being confined solely to the role of designating the state or country whose 
"law" is to control? Has the Conflict of Laws merely the formal task of 
pointing out whether the lex loci, the lex rei sitae, the lex domicilii or the 
le.-r fori is to control? Even if it be assumed that international amity is not 
as yet such that any other than a formal attitude in the soluti9n of Con-
flicts problems is practicable, it does not follow that the same attitude is 
necessarily justifiable between the different states of ·our country. Why 
should the legal relations between ;residents of the different states of this 
country arising out of interstate transactions be determined by such an 
accidental consideration as that of where the last act occurred which would 
be necessary to make a transaction contractually binding according to the 
rules adhered to by the· different states or by the rules of some state arbi-
trarily selected? Should not interests arising out of interstate contractual 
transactions be controlled by economic and social objectives rather than 
technical and arbitrary rules relating to the place where, if at all, the alleged 
contract is deemed to have been made? 83 
82. Cook, supra note 9; Lorenzen, Territoriality, P11blic Policy a11d the Conflict of Laws 
(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 736; Yntema, supra note So; Cavers, snpra note 47; Heilman, supya 
note 47· 
83. See Cavers, mpra note 47; Heilman, s11pra note 47· 
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Another question worthy of the most thoughtful consideration before 
any attempt to restate our law along traditional lines was undertaken was 
whether, in the interests of the administration of justice, the rules of the 
Conflict of Laws should allow some room for choice or discretion. Pro-
fessor Beale's system, as stated above,84 is more rigid in theory than that 
of any foreign country. It is also more rigid than the Anglo-American 
decisions upon which it is supposed to rest. Why is it that the English and 
American courts have refused to subscribe more uniformly to the Conflict 
of Laws rule that the rules of the state where an alleged contract, if any, is 
treated as technically made shall be applied in regard to contractual ques-
tions? Why do they say with such frequency that the rule of the place of 
performance or that of the intention of the parties shall control? Is it not 
because of an instinctive feeling that justice can best be promoted in that 
manner rather than by accepting a rule which may make the legal relations 
of the parties depend exclusively upon accidental circumstances? 
Other problems of a fundamental character in the Conflict of Laws 
require further study before they call-he understood in their full implications. 
One of these is the renvoi doctrine, involving the question to what extent, 
if any, the rules of the Conflict of Laws should be deemed to refer to the 
domestic rules of foreign states or countries rather than to their law in-
clusive of the Conflict of Laws rules. Only a few articles have been de-
voted to this subject in the United States,85 whereas a considerable literature 
has appeared in the other countries since the writing of these articles. 
Another problem has to do with the rules applicable to the "preliminary 
questions" in the Conflict of Laws. Only one article has been published 
on the subject in the United States 86 and much more might be said. 
In the recent continental literature the question has received much attention. 
Before an authoritative restatement of the Conflict of Laws was under-
taken, which might determine the course of the Conflict of Laws during 
many years to come, a study ought to have been made also of the possibility 
of bringing our rules of the Conflict of Laws-at least so far as they relate 
to foreign countries-into greater harmony with those existing elsewhere. 
Another reason why the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws at the 
present time was premature is due to the connection of the Conflict of Laws 
with Constitutional Law. There has been a tendency on the part of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in late years to extend the application 
of various p~ovisions of the Federal Constitution to matters of Conflict of 
84. Supra. 
85. Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory· and the Application of Foreign Law (1910) 10 CoL. 
L. REv. rgo, 327; The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 509: 
Schreiber, The Doctrine of the Renvoi it~ Anglo-American Law (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 523. 
86. Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws (1920) 20 CoL. L. 
REV. 247· 
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Laws, a~d there is as yet no certainty as to how far thi~ process of absorp-
tion will go. 87 It would have been better, therefore, if the Restatement of 
the Conflict of Laws had been postponed until the attitude of the Supreme 
Court had become more clearly defined. 
In the light of the above observations, it is submitted that the American 
Law Institute was ill advised in selecting the Conflict of Laws as one of the 
first subjects for restatement. 
87. See Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v: Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915); Aetna Life 
Insurance Company v. DJ.tnken, 266 U. S. 389 (1924); Modern Woodman of America v. 
Mbcer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land 
Company, 292 U. S. 143 (.1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 28r U. S. 397 (1930); Bradford 
Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932); State qf Ohio y. Chattanooga Boiler & 
Tank Co., 28g U. S. 439 (1933). · 
